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Sale-Leasebacks: A Search for Economic Substance
INTRODUCTION
The levered sale-leaseback is a relatively new transaction. Although it was
used by the railroads as early as the 1850's,' it did not come into widespread
use as a financing tool until the middle of this century.2 As the name implies,
a sale-leaseback involves nothing more than the sale of an asset by one
party, the seller-lessee, to another party, the buyer-lessor, who in turn leases
the property back to the seller-lessee. Both parties benefit by the transaction;
the seller-lessee receives immediate financing in an amount equal to the sales
price and retains beneficial use of the asset for the term of the lease. The
buyer-lessor receives legal title to the asset and the seller-lessee's promise to
make lease payment over a term of years.3
Leverage refers to the buyer-lessor's use of debt to finance her purchase.4
Often the buyer-lessor is unwilling or unable to pay the entire purchase price
herself at the time of the transfer. Instead, she may obtain funds from a
financial institution, so that in a typical modern sale-leaseback the buyer-
lessor may pay only a small fraction of the purchase price herself, financing
the rest of the purchase with debt.5 When debt financing is used the parties
will commonly structure the lease payment schedule to coincide with the
I. P. ELGERS & J. CLARK, THE LEASE/BuY DECISION 112-14 (1980). The railroads did not
use levered leasing as a financing tool. For them the transaction was a way of circumventing
state laws which did not recognize the seller's retention of title in a conditional sales contract
as a defense against the buyer's creditors who lacked knowledge of the contract. See id.
2. See Kronovet, Recharacterization of Real Estate Leases: An Analysis and Proposal, 32
TAx LAW. 757, 760-62 (1979); see also Cook, Sales and Leasebacks, TAX MGMT. (BNA) No.
36, at A-1 (3d ed. 1981).
3. For a discussion of sale-leaseback financing generally, see Carey, Corporate Financing
Through a Sale and Leaseback of Property: Business, Tax, and Policy Considerations, 62 HARv.
L. REv. 1 (1948) [hereinafter cited as Carey, Corporate Financing]; Carey, Tax Aspects of the
Sale and Lease-Back of Corporate Property, 7 N.Y.U. INST. 599 (1949) [hireinafter cited as
Carey, Tax Aspects]; Weinstein & Silvers, The Sale and Leaseback after Frank Lyon Company,
24 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 337, 338-42 (1979). For a discussion of financial planning aspects of
lease financing in general, see W. BRuEG MAN & L. STONE, REAL ESTATE FINANCE 408-35 (7th
ed. 1981); J. VAN HORNE, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND POLICY 254-71 (6th ed. 1968).
4. See generally W. BRUEGGMAN & L. STONE, supra note 3, at 370-76.
5. Fuller, Sales and Leasebacks and the Frank Lyon Case, 48 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 60,
61 (1979).
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loan interest and amortization schedule. 6 The seller-lessee's rental payments
will be set at an amount equal to the buyer-lessor's debt obligations. In that
situation, the buyer-lessor may, in effect, be nothing more than a conduit,
funneling payments from the seller-lessee to a financial institution. 7
This Note is divided into three sections. The first section discusses the
economic aspects of sale-leaseback financing, beginning with a description
of some provisions of the modern sale-leaseback which make it closely
resemble a secured financing arrangement.' Despite the functional resem-
blance of the modern sale-leaseback to more traditional forms of financing,
it offers distinct nontax and tax related benefits which make it a valuable
financing tool. 9 After discussing these benefits, the first section of the Note
concludes with an example of a modern sale-leaseback designed to illustrate
that the transaction, analyzed on a pre-tax basis, rarely is a profitable
proposition for the' buyer-lessor.' 0 Taxes, specifically the depreciation tax
deduction and the investment tax credit, are what make the transaction a
profitable investment." From the buyer-lessor's perspective, the transaction
yields no pre-tax profit.
The second section of this Note focuses on judicial treatment of sale-
leaseback transactions for tax purposes.' 2 In this context the issue often
becomes whether the transaction more closely resembles a secured financing
arrangement or a sale coupled with a lease. This section of the Note focuses
on three recent decisions in which the courts have applied a pre-tax profit
requirement before they would uphold the transaction as styled by the
parties. '3
The third section of this Note contains a criticism of judicial analysis,
especially of the emerging pre-tax profit requirement.' 4 The analysis is too
narrow and ignores the substantial social and economic benefits which sale-
leaseback financing offers. The Note concludes with a proposed mode of
analysis which would explicitly consider these benefits. 5
6. See, e.g., Slater, Capital Accumulation in an Age of Scarcity: A Requiem for the
American Corporation, 12 MEM. ST. U.L. REv. 429, 444 (1982).
7. See, e.g., Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 573 (1978), rev'g 536 F.2d
746 (8th Cir. 1976).
8. See infra notes 16-39 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 40-78 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 79-107.
11. The similarity of the sale-leaseback to secured financing is by no means the only issue
to arise in sale-leaseback litigation. For a good discussion of some of these issues, see generally
Cook, supra note 2.
12. See infra notes 108-230 and accompanying text.
13. Estate of Thomas v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 412 (1985); Rice's Toyota World, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 81 T.C. 184 (1983), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 752 F.2d 89 (4th Cir. 1985);
Hilton v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 305 (1980), aff'd, 671 F.2d 316 (3d Cir. 1982).
14. See infra notes 231-48 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 249-53 and accompanying text.
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I. ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF SALE-LEASEBACKS
A. Similarity to a Mortgage
The simple sale-leaseback closely resembles traditional forms of secured
financing, with the buyer-lessor standing in the shoes of the secured creditor,
and the seller-lessee standing in the shoes of the debtor.' 6 Tax considerations
aside, the primary difference between the two transactions is that in the
secured financing arrangement legal title does not pass to the creditor.'
7
Despite the similarity of secured financing to sale-leasebacks, two sets of
factors exist by which one can distinguish between them. Both sets of factors
are the logical consequences of the passage of legal title in the sale-leaseback
arrangement. First, in the sale-leaseback, the buyer-lessor bears the risks and
burdens of ownership. As owner, the buyer-lessor must pay all expenses
normally associated with asset ownership, namely, taxes, insurance and main-
tenance costs. If the property is destroyed or condemned, she suffers the
loss, and if insurance or condemnation proceeds are made available, they
inure to her benefit. The second distinguishing factor is that at the end of
the lease term, the buyer-lessor gets the reversionary interest in fee.'8
Although the simple sale-leaseback is easily distinguished from a secured
financing transaction, such is not the case for the more typical modern sale-
leaseback. The modern sale-leaseback may incorporate any combination of
features whose purpose and effect is to make the buyer-lessor's investment
in real property practically indistinguishable from a passive secured financing
16. See generally Note, Some Economic and Legal Aspects of Leaseback Transaction, 34
VA. L. REV. 686, 692-94 (1948); Weinstein & Silvers, supra note 3, at 338-41. In both articles,
the discussion is framed in terms of the similarity of the sale-leaseback to mortgage financing.
Because mortgage financing is just a type of secured financing, the broader comparison is
appropriate.
17. In the typical secured transaction the creditor gives the debtor financing and in exchange
receives the debtor's promise to make a series of payments over a term of years. The creditor
retains a security interest in an asset belonging to the debtor, but the debtor retains use of the
asset.
18. See generally Note, Problems of Judicial Interpretation of Real Estate Sale and Lease-
back Taxation: Description. Analysis, and Proposal, 33 TAx LAW. 237, 239-43 (1979-1980). The
thesis of the article is that a relational logic underlies attempts by the courts to recharacterize
sale-leasebacks. Applying this logic, the courts compare the characteristics of the relationship
between the buyer-lessor and the seller-lessee in a particular transaction to the characteristics
of the more traditional relationships existing between buyer and seller, lessor and lessee, and
mortgagor and mortgagee. The court will recharacterize the transaction as a mere financing
arrangement if the relationship between the buyer-lessor and the seller-lessee more closely
resembles the relationship between mortgagor and mortgagee than it does the other two tra-
ditional relationships. The article proposes that the relational logic is inadequate when applied
to sale-leasebacks because these transactions, in their modern form, do not conform to any of
the traditional relationships. Id. at 243-44. See generally Kronovet, supra note 2.
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investment.' 9 These provisions fall into two broad categories which parallel
the factors by which one can distinguish the simple sale-leaseback. The first
category consists of provisions which relieve the buyer-lessor of all or most
of the costs and risks of asset ownership, and the second consists of those
provisions which affect the buyer-lessor's claim to the reversionary estate.20
Most sale-leasebacks incorporate clauses which shift the risks and burdens
associated with asset ownership to the seller-lessee; 2' the net lease is one
such clause. 22 A net lease simply requires the seller-lessee to pay taxes,
insurance and operating expenses, assuring that the buyer-lessor's rental
payments will remain constant, unaffected by unanticipated fluctuations in
those costs. 23 The modern sale-leaseback may also contain specific provisions
allocating the risk of total or partial destruction and condemnation. 24 These
provisions lend themselves to creative drafting and vary considerably from
case to case, but their ultimate effect is to shift all or most of the ownership
risks away from the buyer-lessor and to the seller-lessee. For example, the
buyer-lessor, through lease provisions relating to allocation of insurance and
condemnation proceeds, may secure payment of an amount sufficient to
cover her equity investment plus a specified rate of return. The lease would
allocate any excess funds to the seller-lessee35 Alternatively, the lease could
provide that the seller-lessee would be held absolutely liable for the rent
even if the asset is destroyed or condemned. 26
Another common set of provisions which further blurs the distinction
between a valid sale-leaseback and secured debt financing are those relating
to disposition and control of the buyer-lessor's reversionary interest. These
include the repurchase option, the long-term lease and the renewal option.
A repurchase option simply gives the seller-lessee the right to purchase the
property at the end of the lease term.27 If the option price is close to the
estimated fair market value of the property at the end of the lease, the
repurchase option provides little analytic difficulty; disposition of the prop-
erty at fair market value is not inconsistent with the buyer-lessor's owner-
19. See Note, supra note 18, at 243-45.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 241; see also Note, Sale-Leaseback v. Mere Financing: Lyon's Roar and the
Alternative, 1982 U. ILL. L. REv. 1075, 1077.
22. See W. BRUEGGMAN & L. STONE, supra note 3, at 316.
23. Id. The buyer-lessor's return is constant over the term of the lease because she receives
rentals free and clear of any additional costs. The only risk which she faces with respect to
that return is that the buyer-lessor will default. The buyer-lessor can minimize this risk through
careful selection of a credit-worthy seller-lessee.
24. See, e.g., Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 536 F.2d 746, 749 (8th Cir. 1976), rev'd,
435 U.S. 561 (1978).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. E.g., Note, supra note 21, at 1077 n.9.
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ship.28 Conversely, if the option price is significantly lower than the currently
estimated fair market value at the end of the lease, the transaction becomes
more difficult to distinguish from secured financing. In that situation the
seller-lessee would make an imprudent business decision if he chose not to
exercise his repurchase option. He would be economically compelled to do
so, 29 thereby depriving the buyer-lessor of her reversionary interest at a
fraction of its value. Thus, what began as a simple sale-leaseback, easily
distinguished from secured financing by the fact that the buyer-lessor retained
an unencumbered reversionary interest, becomes more difficult to distinguish
when a bargain purchase option is added.30
Long-term leases are another feature of modern sale-leasebacks which
affect the buyer-lessor's right to enjoy her reversionary interest. If the term
of the lease extends beyond the economic life of the asset, the buyer-lessor's
reversionary interest is worthless, and the transaction again becomes difficult
to distinguish from secured or mortgaged financing. 31 Although the buyer-
lessor retains legal title, the seller-lessee retains beneficial use of the asset.
This resembles secured financing in which the debtor retains both legal and
equitable title to the asset and the creditor's only interest consists of the
income from loan repayments and the right to repossess in the event of the
debtor's default.
3 2
The leaseback may contain a provision giving the seller-lessee the option
to renew his lease at the end of the primary term at a specified rent and
28. See, e.g., Note, Taxation of Sale and Leaseback Transaction-A General Review, 32
VAD. L. REv. 945, 970 (1979). If the repurchase option price is commensurate with the
property's fair market value, the buyer-lessor is still in a position to realize the benefit of
appreciation. The true owner of a piece of property which has appreciated in value is in a
position to realize the benefit of that appreciation; he can sell the property, realizing the benefit
directly, or he can continue to operate and manage the property, realizing the benefit over
time. The buyer-lessor of an asset subject to an option to purchase at a price close to fair
market value stands in the same position. Whether or not the seller-lessee elects to exercise the
option, the buyer-lessor is in a position to realize the benefit of the asset's appreciation.
29. Id.; see also Harmelink & Shurtz, Sale-Leaseback Transactions Involving Real Estate:
A Proposal for Defined Tax Rules, 55 S. CAL. L. Rav. 833, 840-41 (1982) (a useful discussion
of judicial application of the economic compulsion doctrine).
30. See generally Note, supra note 28; see also Del Cotto, Sale and Leaseback: A Hollow
Sound When Tapped, 37 TAx. L. REV. 1, 32-33 (1981).
31. Cf. Note, supra note 18, at 244-45, in which the author states that use of a long-term
lease makes the seller-lessee's position more closely resemble that of a traditional lessor. In the
overall context of the discussion, however, long-term leases also clearly make the lessee's position
closely resemble the position of a mortgagor. One of the characteristics of mortgagor status is
that the mortgagor's position vis-&-vis beneficial use of the property remains unchanged so
long as the mortgagor continues to make mortgage payments. Id. at 242. The long-term lessee stands
in much the same position; his position vis-A-vis beneficial use of the property remains
unchanged so long as he continues to make lease payments. At the end of the lease, equitable
title reverts back to the buyer-lessor. If the lease extends beyond the asset's useful life, however,
the lessor receives nothing of economic value, and the lessee gives up nothing of economic
value.
32. Id. at 242-45.
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for a specified period.33 The document may also provide for more than one
renewal option.34 These renewal options combine some of the analytic dif-
ficulties of both repurchase options and long-term leases. If the renewal
rentals are set at a price commensurate with a reasonable estimate of what
the fair market rental will be at the end of the primary lease, the renewal
provision clause provides little difficulty. The seller-lessee would not be
economically compelled to exercise the option, and the buyer-lessor would
not be precluded from realizing the full economic value of the leased prop-
erty. Even if the parties set the renewal rentals significantly below the
estimated future fair market rental, so that the seller-lessee would be eco-
nomically compelled to exercise his renewals, no problem exists so long as
the renewal periods do not extend beyond the asset's useful life. The buyer-
lessor may not be getting fair market rental value, but her reversion is still
economically valuable. If, however, the seller-lessee's ability to obtain bargain
renewal rentals extends beyond the asset's useful life, the buyer-lessor's
reversion will be worthless and the transaction will be difficult to distinguish
from a secured financing arrangement.35
Modern sale-leasebacks may incorporate several of these features, the net
effect of which is to put the putative buyer-lessor in the same position as
a secured creditor.16 Despite the resemblance of the modern sale-leaseback
to secured financing, it still has many characteristics which make it worth-
while for the parties to use this form of financing. 7 Many of the advantages
which make the sale-leaseback a valuable financing tool are independent of
tax considerations a.3  The most important advantages of the sale-leaseback,
however, lie in its tax consequences, which make the modern leveraged sale-
leaseback profitable for the parties involved. 39
B. Nontax Benefits
Sale-leaseback financing offers nontax advantages over ordinary secured
financing to both parties to the transaction. One of the major nontax
33. See Weinstein & Silvers, supra note 3, at 339.
34. See, e.g., Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 566 (1978), rev'g 536 F.2d
746 (8th Cir. 1976) (the lease contained eight five-year renewal terms).
35. For a good discussion of the relationship between the repurchase option price, the
renewal option price, the renewal option period, the economic life of the asset, and the buyer-
lessor's interest in the reversion, see Harmelink & Shurtz, supra note 29, at 841.
36. See, e.g., Note, supra note 28, at 948-49.
37. See, e.g., Carey, Tax Aspects, supra note 3, at 601-02; Fuller, supra note 5, at 60-63;
Slater, supra note 6, at 444-47; Note, supra note 21, at 1075-83.
38. See infra notes 40-59 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 60-107 and accompanying text; see also Carey, Tax Aspects, supra note
3, at 602 ("While general business and legal considerations have bulked large in determining
whether to enter into a sale and lease-back agreement, there can be no question that the tax
aspect has been an important, and in many cases a controlling, factor.").
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advantages of the sale-leaseback to the borrowing seller-lessee is that it allows
him to realize 100% of the asset's cash value;40 in a secured financing
transaction the borrower can realize only 75-80% of his asset's value. 41 The
transaction also provides a way for the seller-lessee to avoid existing debt
covenants42 or, if new financing is required, to avoid the possible imposition
of new ones. 43 The sale-leaseback also provides a way to raise new capital
for economic entities whose capacity to issue debt or own property is legally
restricted.4
In addition, the sale-leaseback has the potential of improving the seller-
lessee's balance sheet; if the lease meets certain financial accounting criteria,
the seller-lessee can obtain financing without having to report a liability on
the balance sheet.4 Even if the transaction does not meet those accounting
40. See, e.g., Carey, Tax Aspects, supra note 3, at 601; Cook, supra note 2, at A-I; Shurtz,
A Decision Model for Lease Parties in Sale-Leasebacks of Real Estate, 23 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 385, 385-89 (1982). But see Carey, Corporate Financing, supra note 3, at 8.
41. E.g., Cook, supra note 2, at A-I; Note, supra note 28, at 949.
42. Carey, Corporate Financing, supra note 3, at 14-15. Often creditors will impose upon bor-
rowers restrictions intended to assure the continued ability of the borrowers to meet their
debt obligations. These restrictions may take the form of limitations on the borrower's ability
to incur more debt, or a requirement that the borrower maintain a minimum working capital
level, or certain financial ratios. Such restrictive debt covenants may appear in loan agreements
or bond indentures. See also Cook, supra note 2, at A-I; Shurtz, supra note 40, at 389.
43. Carey, Corporate Financing, supra note 3, at 15.
44. Id.; see also Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561,563-64 (1978). In Frank Lyon,
the buyer-lessor was a bank whose ability to incur debt and own land was restricted by state
and federal regulations. The sale-leaseback was the best alternative financing arrangement for
the buyer-lessor. Id. For a discussion of Frank Lyon, see infra notes 117-42 and accompanying
text.
45. This practice is referred to as off-balance-sheet financing. In 1976, the Financial Ac-
counting Standards Board ("FASB") issued Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No.
13, Accounting for Leases ("SFAS No. 13"), which restricted the lessee's ability to use leases
for off-balance-sheet financing. The principle underlying the SFAS No. 13 requirements is that
if the lease transfers all or most of the risks and benefits of ownership to the lessee, he should
report the value of the leasehold estate as an asset, and the corresponding lease obligation as
a liability. Such a lease is referred to as a capital lease. From the seller-lessee's perspective, if
any one of four criteria established by SFAS No. 13 are met, the lease should be classified as
a capital lease. The four criteria are:
1. The lease transfers the asset to the lessee by the end of the lease period.
2. The lease contains a bargain-purchase option.
3. The lease term is equal to or greater than 75% of the estimated economic
life of the asset.
4. At the beginning of the lease, the present value of the minimum lease payments
equals or exceeds 90% of the fair market value of the leased property.
STATEMENT OF FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS No. 13 (Financial Accounting Standards Bd. 1976).
If the lease does not meet any one of these four requirements it should be classified as an
operating lease, in which case the lessee will not have to report the lease as a liability. See,
e.g., How Sale Leasebacks Beat the High Cost of Money, BusNEss WEEK, Jan. 12, 1981, at
26-27 (Anheuser-Busch financed the construction of a new office building in St. Louis without
having to report the lease as a liability because it satisified SFAS No. 13 requirements). See
generally J. VANi HORNE, supra note 3, at 259-62 (discussing generally the accounting treatment
of leases and illustrating the present value and amortization calculations required); see also
1986]
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requirements, it will improve the seller-lessee's working capital position by
converting a fixed asset into cash. 46 Finally, the interest rate implicit in
leaseback rentals is fixed over time. In a period when most debt obligations
contain floating interest rate provisions, the fixed-interest feature of the sale-
leaseback could be an advantage, depending upon the future course of interest
rates .
47
The buyer-lessor also realizes certain nontax benefits from the sale-lease-
back. First, she acquires a piece of rental property with a built-in tenant,
and an investment with cash flows established by contract.4 8 At the end of
the lease she gets the reversionary interest,49 although the extent and value
of that interest depend upon the specific provisions of the lease.5 0 Also,
because the buyer-lessor holds legal title to the asset, she avoids much of
the time delay and expense associated with foreclosure, and in case of the
seller-lessee's bankruptcy, the buyer-lessor stands in a better position than
if she were an ordinary secured creditor .5
Thus, the sale-leaseback has nontax benefits which make it an attractive
alternative to conventional financing techniques. In a tight money market,
when credit is difficult to obtain at reasonable rates, lenders may be more
willing to buy and lease back an asset than they would be to purchase debt. 2
The asset provides a hedge against inflation and, because the lending buyer-
lessor retains legal title, she eliminates the legal problem associated with
foreclosure. 3 Real estate developers have also successfully employed sale-
leaseback arrangements. A developer may have significant real estate holdings
but insufficient capital to develop them. A sale-leaseback allows him to
immediately realize 100oo of the property's value in cash, which he could
then redeploy to other productive development projects.14 The sale-leaseback
Harmelink & Shurtz, supra note 29, at 870-78 (discussing the accounting standards for the
lessor and the lessee and how those standards relate both to the judicial treatment of leases
and to a proposed standard for judicial treatment of leases).
46. See Note, supra note 28, at 950; see also Mandell, Tax Aspects of Sales and Leasebacks
as Practical Devices for Transfer and Operation of Real Property, 18 N.Y.U. INST. 17, 18
(1960) (discussing the balance sheet effects of the sale-leaseback of real property already subject
to a mortgage).
47. If the buyer-lessor expected future market rates to rise, she would look more favorably
upon a sale-leaseback financing opportunity, which would lock in a lower interest rate, rather
than upon a debt financing opportunity for which the interest rate charged would rise with
the market.
48. P. ANDERSON, TAX FACTORS IN REAL ESTATE OPERATIONs 332 (6th ed. 1980).
49. See supra note 18 and accompanying text; see also W. BRUECOMAN & L. STONE, supra
note 3, at 311.
50. See supra notes 27-35 and accompanying text.
51. See J. VAN HORNE, supra note 3, at 495-96.
52. See Note, supra note 28, at 950; Mandell, supra note 46, at 18.
53. Note, supra note 28, at 950.
54. See, e.g., Posner, Renting Money, INc., Apr. 1983, at 121-27. The article chronicles
the story of how a small Arkansas entrepreneur, using sale-leasebacks, financed the expansion
[Vol. 61:721
SALE-LEASEBACKS
is also a useful means of expanding plant capacity in capital intensive
industries.5 Rapidly expanding firms require substantial investments of work-
ing capital into their growing base of fixed assets. 6 Often, their growth rate
will exceed their capacity to generate working capital internally.5 7 In that
situation, the sale-leaseback is a useful tool by which to generate additional
working capital. The retail industry has used the sale-leaseback in this man-
ner. Retail chain stores such as Safeway58 have been able to rapidly increase
the number of their locations by building facilities to their own specifications
and then selling them to investors. 59
C. Tax Benefits
In addition to the substantial nontax benefits, leveraged sale-leasebacks
offer tax benefits as well.6 The fully deductible rental payments6 and the
treatment of any gains or losses resulting from the sale62 are two tax benefits
to the seller-lessee arising out of a valid sale-leaseback. 63 When a borrower
uses secured financing, only that portion of each payment which represents
interest is deductible64-the remaining portion is not. 65 When sale-leaseback
financing is employed, however, any payment made as a condition to the
continued use of an asset in which the seller-lessee has no equity is fully
deductible.Y
The value of the rental deduction varies inversely with the depreciable
nature of the asset sold. 67 When the seller-lessee gives up title to the asset,
any depreciation deduction which he may have been able to claim goes with
it. He must weigh the value of the fully deductible rentals against the value
of his single Waffle House restaurant into a chain of 14 restaurants with combined assets of
over $7 million. The sale-leaseback allowed him to invest his limited resources into productive
working capital as opposed to tying it up in real estate.
55. Note, supra note 28, at 950.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See, e.g., Dunlap v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1377, 1400 (1980), rev'd, 670 F.2d 785
(9th Cir. 1982). Safeway is not the only large retail chain to finance its expansion using the
sale-leaseback. Allied Stores, Federated Department Stores, Gimbels, Sears Roebuck and Mont-
gomery Ward have also successfully used sale-leaseback financing. Carey, Corporate Financing,
supra note 3, at 2 n.4.
59. Note, supra note 28, at 950.
60. For a general discussion of all aspects of lease taxation, see generally Cook, supra note
2.
61. Note, supra note 28, at 952.
62. Id.
63. A complete discussion of depreciation recapture is beyond the scope of this Note.
64. I.R.C. § 163(a) (West 1978).
65. Id. at § 263.
66. Id. at § 162 (a)(3). No requirement exists that the rental payments be reasonable in
order for them to be deductible.
67. See Carey, Corporate Financing, supra note 3, at 18.
1986]
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of the depreciation lost when deciding whether or not to use sale-leaseback
financing. 68 When the seller-lessee sells a newly constructed, fully depreciable
asset, he is merely exchanging the depreciation deduction he could have had
for the rental deduction. The net advantage or disadvantage of this exchange
depends upon the size of the deductions, the term of the lease, and the
depreciable life of the asset. If the asset sold and leased back consists of
entirely nondepreciable real estate, or of a fully depreciated asset, the seller-
lessee creates a depreciation-like rental deduction where none existed before.
69
The sale-leaseback is also a useful tax planning device by which the seller-
lessee can manipulate the timing and recognition of capital gains and losses.7 0
Suppose a taxpayer owned a capital asset whose book value greatly exceeded
its fair market value and also had a large capital gain for the period. By
selling the asset subject to a leaseback, the taxpayer could generate the
capital loss needed to offset his capital gain and still retain use of the asset.
Conversely, suppose the taxpayer had an asset whose fair market value
exceeded its book value. He could avoid capital gain recognition upon sale
and leaseback of the asset simply by making the leaseback for a term
exceeding thirty years. In that situation the sale-leaseback would be treated
as a tax-free, like-kind exchange . 7
The major tax consequences to the buyer-lessor of a valid sale-leaseback
are the availability of the investment tax credit at the inception of the lease,
except to the extent that the purchased assets consist of real estate,72 and
the recognition of rental income offset by the depreciation deduction over
the term of the lease.73 When the buyer-lessor finances her purchase with
debt, she may also deduct her interest payments.7 4 When accelerated depre-
ciation methods are used, the depreciation deduction may well exceed rental
income during the early years of the lease. During those years tax losses
68. If the asset sold were eligible for an accelerated method of depreciation, the value of
the depreciation lost could exceed the value of the rental deduction gained, at least during the
early years of the asset's life.
69. Note, supra note 28, at 952 ("[If the property consists primarily of a non-depreciable
asset, such as land, the full rental deduction has the effect of allowing a depreciation deduction
for the non-depreciable portion of the property.").
70. See generally Note, supra note 28, at 952-53.
71. See I.R.C. § 1031(a)-(c) (West 1985). No capital gain or loss will be recognized on an
exchange of property held for productive use in a trade or business for property of like-kind.
When the exchange is for property of like-kind, plus other property not of like-kind, only a
gain would be recognized, but only to the extent of the value of the other property. Treas.
Reg. § 1.1031 (a)-l(c) (1956) (an exchange of real estate for a leasehold of 30 years or more
is eligible for treatment as a like-kind exchange under I.R.C. § 1031). This section of the code
and the accompanying regulation has been one source of sale-leaseback litigation. The issue in
these cases has been the capital gain or loss treatment of gains or losses on the sale of the
asset. For a good discussion of this line of litigation, see Del Cotto, supra note 30, at 10-23
and cases cited therein. See also Note, supra note 28, at 956-68 and cases cited therein.
72. See Cook, supra note 2, at A-29 to A-32.
73. Id. at A-19 to A-29, A-32 to A-33.
74. See I.R.C. § 163(a) (West 1978).
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will result." When the buyer-lessor has sufficient income from other sources,
however, she can use the tax loss to reduce the amount of that income
subject to tax, thereby reducing her overall tax payment. Thus, a valid sale-
leaseback has tax-shelter potential which produces an economic benefit to
the buyer-lessor.
For both parties, tax considerations play an important role in the decision
of whether to enter into sale-leaseback agreements. 76 For the seller-lessee to
enter into the arrangement, the value of fully deductible rental payments,
plus other nontax benefits, must outweigh the value of the depreciation
deduction foregone and the loss of legal title. 77 For the buyer-lessor to enter
into the transaction, the value of the rental income plus the depreciation
and interest tax benefit must exceed the value of other investment oppor-
tunities foregone. 78
D. Illustration of the Vital Role Played by Taxes
Tax considerations clearly play an important role in the unleveraged sale-
leaseback decision, but when one considers the leveraged sale-leaseback, taxes
play a crucial, if not determining, role.79 The availability of the interest and
depreciation deductions and the investment tax credit to the buyer-lessor are
the foundation upon which the economic viability of the leveraged sale-
leaseback rests.8 0 The introduction of leverage into the transaction does not
change the role which tax considerations play in the seller-lessee's decision,8'
except perhaps to the extent that it affects the size of the rental payments.12
When the buyer-lessor uses debt to finance her purchase, however, the
availability of the tax benefits is quite often the only reason the transaction
is a profitable proposition. 83 An analysis of the profitability of a typical
modern levered sale-leaseback investment on a before-and-after tax basis
illustrates the preeminence of tax considerations to the buyer-lessor's deci-
sion.
75. See infra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
76. See Kronovet, supra note 2, at 759 ("The fact is that the decision of the parties
concerning [what form of financing to adopt] is a tax decision pure and simple."). See also
Carey, Corporate Financing, supra note 3, at 16-17.
77. See Carey, Corporate Financing, supra note 3, at 18.
78. If the investor had not invested her funds in the sale-leaseback, presumably she would
have been able to invest them elsewhere. The return which the next best investment use may
have provided is, therefore, the standard against which her sale-leaseback investment should
be judged.
79. See infra notes 86-99 and accompanying text.
80. See P. ELGERS & J. CLARK, supra note 1, at 107-08.
81. See J. VAN HORNE, supra note 3, at 479.
82. When leverage is used, rental payments are geared to the buyer-lessor's interest and
principal amortization schedule, so the rentals bargained for may be-slightly different in the
levered sale-leaseback context than in the unlevered sale-leaseback context.
83. See infra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
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Consider a firm that needs to purchase a fully depreciable asset costing
$1,250,000 with a depreciable life, for tax purposes, of five years. After
conducting an independent analysis, the firm decides that a sale-leaseback
would be the most desirable financing alternative. 4 A potential buyer-lessor
is willing to pay $250,000, or 20% of the purchase price, out of her own
working capital. She is able to finance the remaining portion at a 10%
annual rate of interest over fifteen years. After serious arms-length nego-
tiations, the parties settle on a leaseback for fifteen years at an annual rent
of $131,474, an amount equal to the loan interest and amortization pay-
ments.85 At the end of the lease the buyer-lessor will retain full control of
the asset which is projected to have a fair market value at that time of
$625,000, 50% of its original cost. Before the buyer-lessor will enter into
the transaction, she must analyze it to see whether it would be a profitable
use of her funds.
Her analysis will focus on the after-tax cash flows which the investment
produces.86 Only if the present value 7 of the after-tax cash inflows exceeds
84. Perhaps the buyer-lessor is legally restricted in her ability to assume new debt. See
supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text. Or perhaps alternative techniques would not yield
sufficient funds, or would yield sufficient funds but at too high a cost. See supra notes 41-42.
85. This example assumes a net lease so that the buyer-lessor's cash flows are net of any
operating expenses. See also supra note 96.
86. Cash, not accounting income, is central to all investment decisions. Cash is used to pay
current expenses and for further investment. A firm's accounting records may reflect healthy
income even though the firm does not have enough cash on hand to meet current expenses.
In addition, any investment analysis which ignores tax considerations is woefully inadequate
and bound to mislead the investor. Cash available after taxes have been extracted is the relevant
consideration for the taxable investor. Pre-tax cash flows are included in this example only to
illustrate how difficult it would be for a leveraged sale-leaseback to produce a pre-tax profit.
87. The present value concept recognizes that a rational investor would prefer receiving $1
today over receiving $1 a year from now. The investor could invest the $1 received today at
a specified rate of return and have more than $1 in a year. For example, suppose an investor
could invest the $1 she receives today in a bank account earning 10% interest. In one year,
that $1 investment would be worth $1.10; in two years, it would be worth $1.21. The investor
should be indifferent to the right to receive $1 today and $1.10 in one year, or $1.21 in two
years. In common parlance, $1 is said to be the present value of $1.10 in one year at 10%,
or of $1.21 in two years at 10%. The interest rate used, in this example 10%0, is referred to
as the discount rate. The present value of a particular future amount can be expressed as a
simple mathematical relationship between the future amount, the discount rate, and the amount
of time until the future amount is received.
PV(X) = X I
(I + k)n
X = sum of money received in the future
n = number of periods into the future when X will be received
k = discount rate
PV(X) = present value of X
Present value calculations allow the analyst to compare on an equal basis sums of money
received or expended at different points in the future. Fortunately, tables are available which
relieve the analyst of the tedium of calculation. See, e.g., H. BIERMAN & S. SMIDT, THE CA I A.




the present value of the after-tax cash outflows will the transaction be
justified. 8 In this example, because the annual rental income which the
buyer-lessor receives is precisely offset by her debt repayment obligation,
the net present value of the pre-tax cash flows generated by her investment
is zero.8 9 Thus, during the primary term of the lease, her $250,000 cash
investment will produce no cash benefits; the only source of pre-tax return
on her investment is the value of her reversionary interest, or the residual
88. This mode of investment analysis is referred to as net present value analysis. See generally
J. VAN HORNE, supra note 3, at 111-12. For a good discussion of other methods of investment
analysis see id. at 108-17; H. BrERmAN & S. SMIDT, supra note 87, at 13-33. Basically, this
technique compares the present value of all cash outflows required for a particular investment
with the present value of all cash inflows which that investment is expected to produce. If the
present value of the cash inflows is greater than the present value of the cash outflows, the
investment will be profitable. That is, the cash returns which the investment is expected to
produce should justify the cash investment required. If the present value of the cash inflows
is less than the present value of the cash outflows, the investment is not justified.
89.





Present Value -0- $149,620
In sale-leaseback net present value analysis, the timing and magnitude of the cash flows
are easily determined. Rent and loan payments are determined by contract, and tax deductions
are established by law. All that needs to be estimated is the value of the buyer-lessor's
reversionary interest. In the example now under consideration, the reversion is worth $625,000.
The discount rate used should simply reflect the buyer-lessor's cost of money. There are many
theories and factors which one must consider to determine what the appropriate discount rate
should be. See, e.g., J. VAN HoRNE, supra note 3, at 90-205. For the purpose of this Note,
however, setting the discount rate equal to the buyer-lessor's after-tax cost of capital is a good
approximation. If the buyer-lessor borrowed all the funds which she has invested in the sale-
leaseback (i.e., $250,000), the investment would have to earn a return just equal to the interest
rate on the loan for the buyer-lessor to break even.
For analyzing pre-tax cash flows, the pre-tax cost of capital should be used; for after-tax
cash flows, the after-tax cost of capital is appropriate. Cf. J. VAN HORNE, supra note 3, at
219-20. The author illustrates the calculation of the discount rate used to evaluate the after-
tax cash flows generated by a bond. These cash flows are closely analogous to the cash flows
generated by a lease. The interest payments over the term of the bond are analogous to the
rental payments over the term of the lease; the payment of principal at the end of the bond's
life is analogous to the receipt of the reversionary estate at the end of the lease. Given the
similar nature of bond and lease cash flows, the adjustment to the discount rate for taxes
should also be similar. If the variables are defined as
t = tax rate,
r = after-tax discount rate, and




is a close approximation of the before-tax discount rate. Id.
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value of her investment. 90 When that figure is discounted to reflect its present
value, 9' the transaction is not justified based only on its pre-tax cash flows.92
The importance of residual value to the pre-tax profitability of the modern
leveraged sale-leaseback should be apparent; where rental payments are offset
by loan amortization payments, the only source of pre-tax return available
to the potential buyer-lessor is the residual. For this particular transaction
to be justified, the residual would have to have been worth $1,044,312. 93
To expect a depreciable asset to hold nearly all of its value for fifteen years,
not considering the effects of inflation, 94 is an unreasonable expectation in
90. Residual value refers to the value of the lessor's reversionary interest. It is a generic
term used in financial analysis to refer to the value of a lump sum, usually the value of an
asset, to be received at the end of a period of cash flows.
91. PV($625,000) = $625,000 1 = $149,620.
(1 + .10)'"
See supra note 87 for the formula. The residual value was discounted at its after-tax discount
rate, 10%, even though the analysis is of pre-tax cash flows. It makes little sense to discount
the value of an asset on a pre-tax basis. Conceptually, the value of an asset simply represents
the market's valuation of the after-tax cash flows which that asset is likely to produce. See
generally B. BOYCE & W. KINNARD, APPRAIsING REAL PROPERTY 435-58 (1984). It would be
inconsistent to discount an after-tax residual value at the pre-tax discount rate.
It is not inappropriate to note, however, that by using the lower, after-tax rate to discount
the value of the residual, the analysis creates a bias in favor of accepting the proposed
transaction. For a given residual value, the lower the discount rate, the higher the present
value. See supra note 87. Thus, a pre-tax cash flow analysis using an after-tax discount rate
is more likely to show a pre-tax profit than one which uses the higher pre-tax discount rate.
Even using the lower after-tax discount rate, only a sale-leaseback with an exceptionally high
residual value will yield a positive net present value. See infra note 93 and accompanying text;
see also infra notes 175-76 and accompanying text.
92. The project is not justified on a pre-tax basis because the initial cash investment,
$250,000, is greater than the present value of the pre-tax cash flows which that investment is
expected to produce, $149,620. See supra notes 87-91.
93. This figure represents the value which the residual would have to have so that its present
value would equal the $250,000 initial investment. If the residual were worth this much, or
more, the cash flows would have a positive net present value and the transaction would have
been justified. Algebraically, the value would be expressed as follows:
$250,000 = X I
(1 + .10)'"
X = $1,044,312
See supra note 87 for the formula. If the pre-tax discount rate had been used, the residual
value required to justify the transaction would be much higher. Assuming the taxpayer is in
the 40% tax bracket, the pre-tax discount rate is:
.10 = .167
(1 - .40)
See supra note 89 for the formula. Using this discount rate the residual value required to
justify the transaction would have been:
$250,000 = X I
(1 + .167)'"
X = $2,524,305
Thus, using the pre-tax discount rate yields even a higher required residual value than an
analysis using the after-tax discount rate.
94. Present value analysis is designed to facilitate the comparability of sums of money
received at different times in the future. Inflation affects the value of money received in the
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most instances. Yet, if the buyer-lessor were to limit her analysis to pre-tax
returns, that is precisely what would have to occur before the transaction
could be considered profitable.
An after-tax analysis of the proposed investments should make clear how
vital tax considerations are in investment analysis. The analysis assumes that
the buyer-lessor elected to use the Accelerated Cost Recovery System (ACRS)95
of depreciation for five-year property.96 In this example the imposition of
income taxes converts what was an unprofitable investment into a profitable
one. This change results primarily from the availability of the depreciation
tax deduction, although one should not ignore the importance of the interest
future, so present value analysis must account for its effects. This can be accomplished in one
of two ways. Cash flows can be expressed in constant, uninflated dollars, in which case no
adjustment need be made to the discount rate. This Note has adopted that approach, so that
all future amounts are expressed in constant dollars. For the transaction under consideration,
the residual value required to justify the transaction on a pre-tax basis, $1,044,312, see supra
note 93 and accompanying text, is expressed in constant dollars, unaffected by inflation.
An alternative method to account for the effects of inflation is to express future cash flows in
inflated future dollars. If this were done, the discount rate would have to be adjusted so that
when the future, inflated amounts were discounted back to the present, the resulting figure
would be expressed in constant dollars. For a good discussion of the effects of inflation on
present value analysis, and the adjustments to the discount rate made necessary by inflation,
see generally J. VAN HORNE, supra note 3, at 504-11.





Loan Interest and Property
Amortization Schedule See I.R.C.
§ 168(b)(1).
Year Total Principal Interest Depreciation
Payment
1 131,474 31,474 100,000 187,500
2 131,474 34,621 96,853 275,000
3 131,474 38,083 93,391 262,500
4 131,474 41,891 89,582 262,500
5 131,474 46,080 85,393 262,500
6 131,474 50,688 80,785
7 131,474 55,758 75,716
8 131.474 61,334 70,140
9 131,474 67,467 64,006
10 131,474 74,214 57,260
11 131,474 81,653 49,839
12 131,474 89,798 41,676
13 131,474 98,778 33,696
14 131,474 108,656 22,818
15 131,474 119,522 11,952
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deduction. 97 During the first five years of the lease term the transaction
would produce tax losses, which represent cash inflows in the sense that
they reduce the buyer-lessor's tax liability on income from other sources.
During the remaining term of the lease, the transaction would produce taxable
income, increasing the buyer-lessor's overall tax liability. These tax-related
cash flows discounted to a common present value basis yield a net cash
inflow to the investor of $202,963.98 When this amount is added to the
present value of the residual, the transaction clearly is profitable on an after-
tax cash flow basis. 99
The foregoing hypothetical, designed to typify a modern levered sale-
leaseback, would not have occurred if the buyer-lessor were unable to take
the depreciation deduction. Without the deduction, no buyer-lessor would
have found the transaction profitable, and the seller-lessee would have been
unable to find a cooperative investor willing to finance his investment project
using a sale-leaseback. The seller-lessee would have had to resort to other,
less desirable financing alternatives or forego the investment project entirely.
Anything which might cast a shadow of doubt over the availability of the
97.
After Tax Cash Flow Analysis
(I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Col. No.
Rent Principle and Interest Depreciaiton Taxable Tax Effect After Tax Present Value
Interest (See note 96) (See note 96) Income (5) x .40 Cash Flow of After Tax
(See note 96) (1-[(3) + (4) 1(1) - (2)] - (6) Cash Flow
1 131,474 131,474 100,000 187,500 156,026 -62,410 62,410 56,491
2 131,474 131,474 96,853 275,500 240,364 -96,145 96,145 79,459
3 131,474 131,474 93,391 262,500 224,417 -89,766 89,766 67,442
4 131,474 131,474 89,582 262,500 220,608 -88,243 88,243 60,271
5 131,474 131,474 85,393 262,500 216,419 -86,567 86,567 53,751
6 131,474 131,474 80,785 50,689 20,275 -20,275 -11,445
7 131,474 131,474 75,716 55,758 22,303 -22,303 -11,445
8 131,474 131,474 70,140 61,334 24,533 -24,533 -11,445
9 131,474 131,474 64,006 67,468 26,987 -26,987 -11,445
10 131,474 131,474 57,260 74,214 29,685 -29,685 -11,445
11 131,474 131,474 49,839 81,635 32,654 -32,654 -11,445
12 131,474 131,474 41,676 89,798 35,919 -35,919 -11,445
13 131,474 131,474 32,696 98,778 39,511 -39,511 -11,445
14 131,474 131,474 22,818 108,656 43,463 -43,642 -11,445
15 131,474 1131,474 11,952 119,522 1 47,808 1-47808 1-I1445
Total Present Value of After Tax Cash Flows
Present Value of Residual (See supra note 87)




98. See supra note 97.
99. The transaction is clearly justified because the present value of the cash inflows produced,
$291,174, is greater than the present value of the cash outflows required, $250,000.
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depreciation deduction would inhibit potential investors for fear that the
transaction, once entered into, would be denied its major source of prof-
itability.
Unfortunately, the similarity of the sale-leaseback to secured financing
creates just that shadow of doubt. One issue which often arises in sale-
leaseback litigation is how closely the transaction resembles a secured fi-
nancing agreement.100 If the court concludes that the transaction looks more
like a secured financing arrangement than a valid sale-leaseback, the court
will recharacterize it, treating the buyer-lessor as a secured creditor and the
seller-lessee as an ordinary debtor. The tax consequences are devastating;
the buyer-lessor loses the depreciation deduction, and recognizes as income
only that part of each rental payment which represents interest. The seller-
lessee loses the full rental deduction, but may continue to deduct the interest
portion of each rental payment. The lost rental deduction would be offset
by the regained depreciation deduction.' 0'
Tax planners and business persons should be aware of the threat of judicial
recharacterization whenever they consider a sale-leaseback.'10 The courts have
never clearly defined the characteristics or features of a sale-leaseback that
would trigger recharacterization. 03 Tax planners have no clear standards
against which to judge sale-leasebacks in order to accurately assess the risk
of recharacterization. As long as this uncertainty exists, the sale-leaseback
will be a suspect transaction in the eyes of the business community.
In 1978, the United States Supreme Court in Frank Lyon Co. v. United
States,'°0 analyzed a sale-leaseback transaction for only the second time in
its history.'0 - In that case, the Court established a set of very general criteria' 06
100. See, e.g., Rice's Toyota World, Inc. v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 184 (1983), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 752 F.2d 89 (4th Cir. 1985) (discussed infra at notes 189-209 and accom-
panying text); Narver v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 53 (1980), aff'd, 670 F.2d 855 (9th Cir. 1982)
(discussed infra at notes 181-88 and accompanying text); Dunlap v. Commissioner, 74 T.C.
1377 (1980), rev'd, 670 F.2d 785 (9th Cir. 1982); Hilton v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 305 (1980),
aff'd, 671 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1982) (discussed infra at notes 142-80 and accompanying text);
Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561 (1978), rev'g 536 F.2d 746 (8th Cir. 1976)
(discussed infra at notes 117-41 and accompanying text); Sun Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 562
F.2d 258 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 944 (1978); American Realty Trust v. United
States, 491 F.2d 1194 (4th Cir. 1974), aff'g 33 A.F.T.R. 2d (P-H) 74-393 (E.D. Va. 1973);
Helvering v. Lazarus, 308 U.S. 252 (1939).
101. See generally Shurtz, supra note 40, at 392; Note, supra note 21, at 1083.
102. See Hobbet, Estimating the Risk of Failure When a Tax Shelter Investment is Being
Evaluated, 74 J. TAx. 74 (Aug. 1984). The author suggests a framework for evaluating the risk
of recharacterization of various tax shelter investments using as an example Rice's Toyota
World, Inc. v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 184 (1983), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 752 F.2d 89
(1985). For a discussion of Rice, see infra notes 189-209 and accompanying text.
103. See, e.g., Note, supra note 21, at 1083-96.
104. 435 U.S. 561 (1978), rev'g 536 F.2d 746 (8th Cir. 1976).
105. The Court first considered a sale-leaseback in Helvering v. Lazarus, 308 U.S. 252 (1939).
106. 435 U.S. at 583-84.
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to which the lower courts have looked in subsequent sale-leaseback decisions.
The judiciary's efforts to give meaning to the broad standards established
in Frank Lyon have led it down the road toward a judicial standard, which,
if faithfully applied, would result in the recharacterization of most, if not
all, sale-leasebacks. I7 What the Court apparently may now require to uphold
a sale-leaseback transaction is a pre-tax profit on the buyer-lessor's invest-
ment.
II. JuDicIAL TREATMENT OF SALE-LEASEBACKS
The judicial treatment of sale-leasebacks can best be characterized as a
search for economic substance. The Supreme Court first analyzed a sale-
leaseback in 1939 in Helvering v. Lazarus.0 s Lazarus transferred property
to a bank as trustee, and leased the property back for ninety-nine years with
an option to renew or repurchase. °9 Although Lazarus differs from the
typical sale-leaseback case in that the seller-lessee claimed the depreciation
deduction and sought to have the transaction recharacterized as a mortgage,
the holding in Lazarus is noteworthy because it established the standard by
which courts since have evaluated sale-leasebacks. The Supreme Court, dis-
missing the Commissioner's argument that depreciation should follow legal
title," 0 held, "[in the field of taxation, administrators of the laws, and the
courts, are concerned with substance and realities and formal docuinents are
not rigidly binding.""'
The decision in Lazarus gave very little guidance concerning what "sub-
stance and realities" would be required to validate a sale-leaseback in the
future. Perhaps the fact that the Supreme Court's decision affirmed the
analysis used by the two lower courts which considered the case offers some
guidance. Their analysis was based on two factors: the intent of the parties," 2
and the allocation of the risks and benefits of ownership which resulted
from the transaction." 3 After Lazarus, and through Lyon,' "1 the Commis-
sioner and the courts have focused their analysis of sale-leasebacks on these
two factors. The Commissioner generally favored the risk-benefit analysis,"'
107. See infra notes 142-209 and accompanying text.
108. 308 U.S. 252 (1939).
109. Id. at 253.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 255.
112. Commissioner v. F. & R. Lazarus & Co., 101 F.2d 728 (6th Cir. 1939), aff'g 32 B.T.A.
633 ,(1935).
113. Id. at 730.
114. Id. at 729-31.
115. The Commissioner's position is illustrated by Rev. Rul. 68-590, 1968-2 C.B. 66. There
the Service considered a sale-leaseback transaction in which a corporation proposed to sell a
project to a political subdivision for a price not to exceed the proceeds from the political
[Vol. 61:721
SALE-LEASEBACKS
while the courts favored neither." 6
After Lazarus, the Supreme Court did not hear a sale-leaseback case for
thirty-nine years, until Frank Lyon Co. v. United States."7 The facts of
Frank Lyon are quite complex, but the final form of the transaction is
typical of the modern sale-leaseback. Worthen, an Arkansas bank, elected
for compelling business reasons"" to use a sale-leaseback transaction to finish
the construction of its new banking headquarters. After a protracted search
the bank selected Lyon, an Arkansas corporation seeking to diversify its
investment portfolio, to act as the buyer-lessor." 9 Lyon used $500,000 of
his own money to purchase the building and borrowed the remaining
$7,140,000 of the purchase price from the New York Life Insurance Com-
subdivision's sale of industrial development bonds. The political subdivision would then lease
the property back to the corporation under the terms of a net lease. The lease provided for a
20-year term, a repurchase option and rentals which would just cover payments on the bond.
The corporation would receive any insurance or condemnation proceeds in excess of amounts
outstanding on the bonds. Citing Lazarus, 308 U.S. 252 (1939), the Service analyzed the risk-
benefit allocation provided for by the proposed transaction, and on that basis held that the
corporation should be treated as owner for tax purposes:
The corporation has all the burdens and benefits of ownership. The corporation
is obligated to repay the principal cost of the project plus interest in the form of
basic rentals. It is also obligated to pay the normal costs of operating the project
plus the financing expenses in the form of additional rent. In the event of default,
casualty, or condemnation, the corporation has the same substantive rights and
obligations as a mortgagor. It is clear that the parties intend legal title to the
project to pass to the corporation. The existence of an option to renew does not
negate this intent since rental during any renewal periods is nominal and the
corporation still retains the right to acquire legal title upon payment of a nominal
sum.... Accordingly, the corporation is considered to be the owner of the project
for Federal income tax purposes.
Id. at 68.
116. The two major sale-leaseback cases decided before Frank Lyon Co., American Realty
Trust v. United States, 491 F.2d 1194 (4th Cir. 194), aff'g 33 A.F.T.R. 2d (P-H) 74-393 (E.D.
Va. 1973), and Sun Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 562 F.2d 258 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436
U.S. 944 (1978), illustrate the two approaches- taken by the courts.
In American Realty Trust, the Commissioner sought to recharacterize the sale-leaseback as a
secured financing agreement, basing his arguments on the risk-benefit analysis suggested by Lazarus,
308 U.S. 252, and on the contention that the buyer-lessor was economically compelled to exercise
a repurchase option contained in the lease. See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text. The Fourth
Circuit rejected these arguments and upheld the transaction as styled by the parties based upon
the conclusion that they had intended a valid sale-leaseback.
In Sun Oil Co., the Third Circuit recharacterized a sale-leaseback as a secured financing
transaction. After listing a series of findings of fact indicating that the seller-lessee bore all
the risks and burdens of ownership, the court concluded that the whole transaction was nothing
more than a financing agreement disguised as a sale-leaseback. 562 F.2d at 265-68.
117. 435 U.S. 561 (1978).
118. Id. at 563-64.
119. Id. at 564-65.
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pany.'2 0 Lyon leased the building back to Worthen under a net lease for an
initial term of twenty-five years with successive options to renew, totaling
forty years, at greatly reduced rentals.2 1 Upon the insistence of the State
Banking Commission, the lease gave Worthen the option to purchase the
building at the end of the eleventh, fifteenth and twentieth years of the
primary lease term.22
The Commissioner disallowed Lyon's claimed depreciation deduction for
1969 and assessed an income tax deficiency of $280,387.123 The government,
contending that Worthen, not Lyon, was the true owner of the building for
income tax purposes, attempted to recharacterize the transaction as two
separate loans to Worthen:' u one by New York Life for $7,140,000 for
which Lyon was merely a conduit, funneling payments from Worthen to the
insurance company,12' the other from Lyon for $500,000 at 6%. The lower
courts' treatment of the Frank Lyon case clearly illustrates the divergent
approaches taken by the courts after Lazarus: the tax court upheld the
transaction applying a strict intent-of-the-parties analysis, 26 while the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the tax court based on a risk-benefit
analysis. 27
120. Id. at 568. The loan from New York Life was for a term of 25 years at 6.75%, and
was secured by a deed of trust to the land and buildings plus an assignment of Lyon's interest
in the lease. Id.
121. Id. at 566.
122. Id. at 564, 567.
123. Id. at 568.
124. Id. at 569.
125. Id.
126. See Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 75-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9545, at 87,592 (E.D.
Ark. 1975). The tax court applied an intent-of-the-parties test. Its analysis and holding is best
expressed in a Letter of Memorandum, dated May 16, 1975, reproduced in the tax court's
opinion:
After having heard the evidence and the arguments and after having read the
excellent briefs filed by the parties, the Court finds that it was the intention of
the parties, as evidenced by their written agreements, read in the light of attending
facts and circumstances existing at the time the agreement was executed, that the
transaction be exactly what the language and form of the transaction indicate,
that is, a sale-leaseback with option to repurchase. This was both the "subjective"
intent of the parties, and it is also the "objective" intent as expressed by the
clear, unambiguous language of the written instruments involved. The Court also
finds and concludes that, objectively, the transaction was in substance, as well
as in form, a sale-leaseback with option to repurchase. Any other view of the
case would not only bring strange and untenable results, but would be both unjust
and contrary to the intent and purpose of our tax laws.
127. See Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 536 F.2d 746 (1978). On appeal, the Eighth
Circuit specifically rejected the tax court's intent analysis, saying" that the subjective intent of
the parties is important only to the extent that it affects the objective allocation of ownership
interests provided for in the documents. Id. at 751. The court interpreted the issue presented
to be whether "the taxpayer has demonstrated that it possesses genuine interests in the property
to establish its legal right to be considered the owner for tax purposes." Id. it 752. It then
analogized ownership of property rights to a bundle of sticks, and concluded Lyon "totes an
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari 28 to resolve the apparent conflict
between the intent-of-the-parties analysis adopted by the Fourth Circuit, 29
and the risk-benefit analysis adopted by the Eighth Circuit in Lyon. The
Supreme Court considered the transaction as a whole, not limiting its analysis
solely to a consideration of the parties' intent, or to the allocation of risks
and benefits between them. The final holding in Lyon did not add much to
the sale-leaseback analysis; it only combined the two existing modes of
analysis, risk-benefit and intent, under the general rubric of economic sub-
stance. Frank Lyon is noteworthy not so much for what it said as for how
courts have treated it since. 30
After recapitulating the facts of the case,' the Court began its analysis
with the frequently repeated platitude: "[fin applying the doctrine of sub-
stance over form the court has looked to the objective economic realities of
the transaction rather than to the particular form the parties employed."' 32
Although the Court recognized that the transaction was nothing more than
a financing arrangement, 33 it discussed several factors which indicated that
the objective economic realities of the transaction were those of a valid sale-
leaseback. The Court considered persuasive the fact that the transaction
involved three parties instead of two, but it never clearly explained why. 3 4
The Court also emphasized the fact that Lyon was personally liable on the
mortgage notes.'35 The effect on Lyon of these liabilities went beyond the
"abstract possibility" that Worthen would for some reason be unable to
pay the rent. 36 Lyon reported the obligations on its balance sheet, which
affected its financial position and its future ability to borrow. Again, the
Court did not give a satisfactory explanation of why this was the substance
of a valid sale-leaseback.
The Court also rejected the government's argument that Lyon's $500,000
equity investment was nothing more than a loan at 60/o.1' 7 "There [were]
simply too many contingencies including variations in the value of real estate,
in the cost of money, and in the capital structure of Worthen" to make the
argument plausible. 3
empty bundle." Id. at 751. The court listed a series of factors which indicated that Worthen
toted most of the sticks, but gave no indication of the relative weight to be placed on each.
Id. at 752-53.
128. 429 U.S. 1089 (1977).
129. See American Realty Trust, 498 F.2d 1194.
130. See Kronovet, supra note 2, at 771.
131. Frank Lyon, 435 U.S. at 561-72.
132. Id. at 573.
133. See id. at 576.
134. Id. at 575.
135. See id. at 576-78.
136. Id. at 577.
137. Id. at 579.
138. Id.
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At the end of its opinion, the Court listed twenty-six factors indicative
of the substance and economic realities of a valid sale-leaseback transac-
tion. '9 It concluded its analysis with a holding which attempted to summarize
those factors. The Court stated:
In short, we hold that where, as here, there is a genuine multiple-party
transaction with economic substance which is compelled or encouraged
by business or regulatory realities, is imbued with tax-independent con-
siderations, and is not shaped solely by tax-avoidance features that have
meaningless labels attached, the government should honor the allocation
of rights and duties effectuated by the parties. Expressed another way,
so long as the lessor retains significant and genuine attributes of the
traditional lessor status, the form of the transaction adopted by the
parties governs for tax purposes.' '°
Commentators were quick to attack the Supreme Court's analysis and holding
in Lyon.' 41 The Court neither explained why the genuine multiple-party
requirement was important, nor gave any indication of what economic sub-
stance would constitute a valid sale-leaseback. In this regard the twenty-six
listed factors provided little guidance; some related to the allocation of risks
and benefits between the parties, and others related to the economic realities
which compelled the final form of the transaction. The Court never clearly
distinguished between risk-benefit and economic substance, and the holding
quoted above was too broad and general to be of much assistance to tax
planners or to the courts.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court had spoken, and the lower courts had
to give meaning to its holding, however vague and indefinite it may have
been. Post-Lyon attempts to give meaning to economic substance have left
intact elements of the intent and risk-benefit analysis. Since Lyon, however,
these elements have assumed a smaller role in the analysis, as courts in-
creasingly have focused on the pre-tax profit potential of sale-leaseback
transactions.
Hilton v. Commissioner,142 decided two years after Lyon, involved the
sale and leaseback of a department store in Bakersfield, California. In 1964
Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc. (Broadway) decided to construct several de-
partment stores in California. It chose to finance the project using a sale-
leaseback and formed Fourth-Cavendish Properties, Inc. (Fourth Cavendish),
139. Id. at 582-83.
140. Id. at 583-84.
141. See, e.g., Fuller, supra note 5, at 60; Rosenberg & Weinstein, Sale Leasebacks: An
Analysis of These Transactions After the Lyon Decision, 45 J. TAX. 146 (1976); Soloman &
Fines, Sale Leasebacks and the Shelter Oriented Investor: An Analysis of Frank Lyon Co.,
and Est. of Franklin, 56 TAXEs 618 (1979); Weinstein & Silvers, supra note 3, at 337; Wolfman,
The Supreme Court in the Lyon's Den: A Failure of Judicial Process, 66 CORNELL L. REv.
1075 (1980-1981); Zarrow & Gordon, Supreme Court's Sale-Leaseback Decision Lists Multiple
Criteria, 49 J. TAx. 42 (1978); Note, supra note 21, at 1075.
142. 74 T.C. 305 (1980), aff'd, 671 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1982).
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a single-purpose financing corporation, to act as buyer-lessor to the trans-
action.' 43 Fourth Cavendish funded the purchase through a group of five
insurance companies. 44 Hilton and the other petitioners obtained an interest
in the properties through a series of assignments to a complex set of tiered
partnerships. Their investment came to $334,000. 4
Fourth Cavendish simultaneously leased the property back to Broadway
under a net lease with an initial term of thirty years and renewals totaling
an additional sixty-eight.'" Rent during the initial term of the lease was set
at an amount equal to that required to amortize 90% of Fourth Cavendish's
loan over thirty years. 47 Rent decreased substantially for the first twenty-
three-year renewal period, then dropped even further for the remaining forty-
five years. 4 Broadway's obligation to pay rent was absolute, except in the
event of total destruction or condemnation of the property.
49
Broadway retained the right to terminate the lease at any time, but in
order to do so, it had to make an irrevocable offer to pay Fourth Cavendish
an amount equal to the unamortized portion of its outstanding loan. 50
Insurance or condemnation proceeds would inure to Broadway's benefit,
either directly, or indirectly in the form of decreased rentals. 5 ' If Fourth
Cavendish found a purchaser of its interest in the Bakersfield property,
Broadway had the prior right to repurchase that interest for $50,000.1 2
Finally, Broadway retained the unrestricted right to sublet the property.'53
The Hilton court began its analysis by briefly viewing the transaction from
the seller-lessee's point of view. 5 4 It recited the advantages of sale-leaseback
financing to a seller-lessee,' and concluded that, from the seller-lessee's
point of view, the transaction was compelled by economic realities, had
143. 74 T.C. at 314, 343. Broadway elected to use the intermediary financing corporation
because it found through experience that it could obtain more favorable loan terms that way.
Id. at 311.
144. Id. at 315. As security for the loan, Fourth Cavendish gave trustees for the insurance
company a mortgage, a deed of trust, and assigned to them its interest in the lease.
145. See id. at 356.
146. See id. at 314.
147. Id. at 325. Rent during the initial term of the lease was $198,603 per year. Id. at 314.
148. Id. Annual rent during the first renewal period was $47,062 per year, and during the
second it was only $31,375. Id.
149. Id. at 326.
150. Id.
151. See id. Insurance or condemnation proceeds were to be first applied to the restoration
of the property; any excess above that amount was to be retained by the lessor. Even if some
of the proceeds were turned over to the lessors, Broadway would still benefit because, in that
event, rent was to be reduced proportionately. Id.
152. Id. at 366-67.
153. Id. at 327.
154. Id. at 346-48.
155. Id. at 347. The advantages which the court specifically mentioned were the availability
of 100% financing, the avoidance of debt covenants, and the fully deductible rent. Id.
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economic substance and was imbued with tax-independent considerations. 56
The court recognized that from this viewpoint, the sale-leaseback, the pro-
visions of which were in conformity with most modern sale leasebacks, 5 7
satisfied all but the genuine multiple-party requirement of Lyon. To analyze
that requirement, the court turned its analysis to the economic bona fides
of the transaction to the buyer-lessor. 58
Most of the tax court's opinion focused on the economic substance of
the transaction from the buyer-lessor's point of view. 59 To satisfy the dictates
of Frank Lyon, the buyer-lessors would have to "show not only that their
participation in the sale-leaseback was not motivated or-shaped solely by
tax avoidance features that have meaningless labels attached, but also that
there is economic substance to the transaction independent of its apparent
tax shelter potential."1'' To find such economic substance in the buyer-
lessor's position, the court looked not to the allocation of risks and benefits
to the buyer-lessor, but rather looked to see whether the foreseeable value
of the property would ever make abandonment imprudent.' 6' It characterized
this as an extension of the imprudent abandonment test developed in Estate
of Franklin v. Commissioner,62 but in applying this test, the Hilton court,
in effect, converted it to a pre-tax profit potential analysis. Although it
never clearly stated so, the court apparently believed that if the return on
the investment which the transaction promised were sufficient to make aban-
donment imprudent, the transaction would possess the requisite economic
substance.
The court focused its analysis on whether the transaction's pre-tax profit
potential justified the original cash investment. It began this part of its
analysis by identifying four sources of return to which the buyer-lessors
might reasonably have looked to justify their investment: the proceeds re-
sulting from selling the asset, refinancing the mortgage, or condemnation,
and the cash income generated by the lease and residual value of the asset. 63
The court rejected all four as offering no reasonable hope of providing a
156. Id. at 347-48.
157. Id. at 347.
158. See id. at 348:
But what Broadway sees is a reflection from only one polygon of the prism. In
the Frank Lyon case, the Supreme Court appraised not only the substance of the
seller-lessee's interest, but also that of the buyer-lessor .... We, therefore, now
turn to a consideration of the substance of the buyer-lessor's interest ....
159. Id. at 348-57.
160. Id. at 349-50.
161. Id. at 350.
162. 544 F.2d 1045 (9th Cir. 1977), aff'g 64 T.C. 752 (1975).
163. Hilton, 74 T.C. at 355. At trial, both the buyer-lessors and the commissioner presented
the expert testimony of real estate appraisers concerning the pre-tax cash flows which the buyer-
lessors could reasonably expect to earn on their investment. Id. at 336-38. The court considered




return to the buyer-lessors. Their right to profit from the sale of their interest
in the asset was circumvented by the lease provision giving Broadway the
prior right to purchase the interest for $50,000.'6 The only way that the
buyer-lessors could profit from refinancing the mortgage would be if interest
rates fell substantially below the 5.125% charged on the Fourth Cavendish
mortgage, 6 an occurrence which the court considered an unlikely eventu-
ality.'"6 Finally, the court dismissed the notion that buyer-lessors might have
looked to condemnation proceeds as a source of profit by noting that "the
possibility of condemnation for a substantial amount of money, sometime
in the future, of a ... department store building is not, in and of itself, the
sort of speculative chance to which even incorrigible gamblers-which we
assume these petitioners are not-would likely be attracted."' 67
The only other potential source of profit to the buyer-lessors was the
income generated by the lease and the residual value of the asset. The Hilton
court rejected this source of return as well by using an analysis based on
net present value and pre-tax cash flow concepts. The Commissioner's expert
conducted an in-depth study of trends in population growth and retail
merchandising, and of the probable future development of the area sur-
rounding Broadway's Bakersfield location. On the basis of these studies the
expert concluded, and the court agreed, that the seller-lessee would exercise
only its first option to renew at the reduced rental. 6 The expert also assumed
that the buyer-lessors would elect to refinance the unamortized principal
remaining at the end of the primary lease term, and that they could do so
at 5.125%.' 69 Using these assumptions, the court calculated that the net cash
flows to the buyer-lessors during the first renewal term would be $23,000
annually. 70 At the end of the renewal term, the reversionary interest would
have no net value. 17'
The Hilton court then expressly applied a pre-tax profitability test:
It goes without saying that the opportunity to earn $23,000 annually,
commencing 30 years from the inception of the transaction, would not
164. Id. at 357; see also supra note 152 and accompanying text.
165. Id. at 359.
166. Id. The mortgage allowed for pre-payment. Thus, if interest rates fell substantially, the
lessors could borrow the amount outstanding on the original mortgage and satisfy that obli-
gation. The lessors would still be receiving rentals calculated to satisfy the original 5.125%
mortgage, but their new obligation would be at a lower rate. This differential in interest rates
would be the source of profit through refinancing.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 355. Further renewals would not be justified because after the expiration of the
primary term of the lease plus the first renewal in the year 2020, the property would not have
economic value as a retail merchandising location. Id. at 354-55.
169. Id. at 355-56.
170. Id. at 356. Annual financing costs during the renewal period would be approximately
$23,000 per year. Rental income would be $47,067.50, leaving approximately $23,000 in pre-
tax cash available for the buyor-lessors.
171. Id. at 354-55.
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in and of itself appear to justify the $334,000 original investment by the
petitioners ... 172
"[Ain analysis of the cash flow from the rentals to be received when adjusted
to reflect the financing costs indicates that there would be no cash available
for distribution to [the buyer-lessors] until the 31st year of the lease term
and that where tax considerations are not taken into account the return
at that time is too small to justify the wait."'I7
Once the court settled on a pre-tax profit requirement, its conclusion was
inevitable. Virtually no long-term levered sale-leaseback will produce a pre-
tax profit. 74 Because leverage postpones pre-tax cash flows until the end of
the lease term, only an exceptionally large residual value will justify the
transaction. Under the Hilton court's assumptions, 171 the department store
building costing $3,137,000 in 1967 would not only have had to have held
its value for fifty-three years, it would also have to have appreciated in
value, ignoring the effects of inflation, to $4,446,235, 176
The Hilton court's definition of economic substance in effect discarded
traditional risk-benefit analysis and robbed the intent analysis of any practical
effect. Had the court applied a risk-benefit analysis it could easily have
reached the same result, for clearly the seller-lessee bore all the incidents of
ownership. 17 Yet, the court held that the existence of a nonrecourse mortgage
and net lease with rentals geared, not to fair market rentals, but to the
buyer-lessor's loan amortization schedule, were "nothing more than neutral
commercial realities."' 7 8 The fact that destruction and condemnation pro-
172. Id. at 356.
173. Id. at 356-57 (emphasis added) (quoting expert's report).
174. See supra notes 84-92 and accompanying text.
175. The Hilton court assumed that Broadway would exercise only its first 23-year renewal
option. Under that assumption, the petitioners would not realize any residual value for 53
years. The cash flows produced by their investments could be divided into three periods. During
the first 23 years of the lease there would be no net pre-tax cash flows. During the second 23
years there would be an annual cash flow of $23,000. Finally, at the end of 53 years, the
buyer-lessors would have realized the residual values which the court assumed would be zero.
176. The calculations assume that Hilton was taxed at a 40% rate and that the after-tax
discount rate equals Fourth Cavendish's cost of borrowing, 5.125%. The $23,000 per year pre-
tax cash flows commencing in 23 years were first discounted at the pre-tax discount rate (5.125%
/ (1- .40)) or 8.542%, see supra note 89 for the formula, to their present value, $19,533.824.
This figure was then subtracted from the initial cash investment of $344,000 to yield a net
present value of $314,466. This amount represents the present value which some residual to be
received in 53 years, discounted at the after-tax discount rate of 5.125%, would have to have
in order for the transaction to be justified.
PV(X) = 314,466 = X I
(1 + .05125)13
X = 4,446,235.
See supra note 87 for the formula. The residual value which the Hilton court would have
required in order to uphold the transaction would have been $4,446,235.
177. See supra notes 142-53 and accompanying text.
178. Id. at 348.
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ceeds would inure to the benefit of the buyer-lessor was a possibility too
remote for the court to consider. 7 9 An assertion that the seller-lessee entered
into the transaction to obtain the substantial nontax- and tax-related ad-
vantages of sale-leaseback financing constituted a showing of intent sufficient
to satisfy the court. 180 The Hilton court apparently equated economic sub-
stance with a pre-tax profit potential.
In Narver v. Commissioner,'8 decided in the same year as Hilton, the tax
court declined to apply the same sort of cash-flow analysis. Narver included
a sale-leaseback typical in all respects except one; the sales price, $1,800,000,182
exceeded the fair market value of the property sold, which the court estimated
to be $412,000.183 Once again the issue before the court was whether the
buyer-lessors had an investment in the property sufficient to support the
depreciation deduction.' 4
The court disallowed the tax consequences of the transaction as structured,
but not based on a comparison of the buyer-lessor's investment in the
property to the pre-tax return which that investment could be expected to
produce. Instead, the decision was based on the gross disparity between the
sales and fair market prices, and on the close relationships among the parties.
Using the imprudent abandonment test"8 5 developed in Estate of Franklin16
and applied in Hilton, the court reasoned that "[e]ven after 15 years of
principal payments, the outstanding debt would still be substantially more
thari the building's original fair market value.' 87 The sales price and debt
principal were so greatly inflated that the buyer-lessor's chosen method of
payment would not yield an equity in the property quickly enough to justify
the claimed depreciation deductions. 88
The Narver decision does not mean that the court had abandoned the pre-
tax profitability analysis. All that Narver stands for is that where the sales
price is highly inflated, the court can find lack of substance using other
modes of analysis. In cases where the sales price does not so clearly exceed
fair market value, the court presumably would still use the pre-tax cash flow
analysis.
Three years after Narver, the tax court again considered a sale-leaseback
in Rice's Toyota World, Inc. v. Commissioner.8 9 Rice, a North Carolina
179. Id. at 359.
180. Id. at 346-47.
181. 75 T.C. 53 (1980), aff'd, 670 F.2d 855 (9th Cir. 1982).
182. Id. at 66.
183. Id. at 92.
184. Id. at 98.
185. See supra notes 161-62 and accompanying text.
186. 544 F.2d 1045 (9th Cir. 1976), aff'g 64 T.C. 752 (1975).
187. 75 T.C. at 100.
188. Id.; see also Hilton, 74 T.C. at 350.
189. 81 T.C. 184 (1983), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 752 F.2d 89 (4th Cir. 1985).
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Toyota salesman, purchased a 70% interest'" in a six-year-old IBM computer
for $1,455,227.'19 Rice paid for the machine by giving Finalco a $250,000
recourse note, payable over three years,' 92 and two nonrecourse notes totaling
$1,205,227, payable over eight years. 93 Rice leased the computer back to
Finalco for eight years with rents calculated so that the pre-tax cash flows
to Rice, net of its nonrecourse obligation to Finalco, were $10,000 per year
over the term of the lease. 94 In fact, Finalco never actually paid rent, and
Rice never actually paid its nonrecourse debt obligations;, the only money
ever to change hands was the $10,000 annual cash flow to Rice, representing
the excess of Rice's rental income over its debt obligations. 95
The tax court in Rice employed the Lyon "economic substance" analysis.
It interpreted Lyon to require that Rice, the buyer-lessor, show two things
for the transaction to withstand scrutiny: he would have to show first, that
he was motivated by nontax considerations, or that he possessed a business
purpose, 9 6 and second, that the transaction was supported by sufficient
economic substance. 97 The Rice court equated "economic substance" with
pre-tax profit potential. It would "analyze the transaction as a prudent
businessman would to ascertain whether it had economic substance apart
from its beneficial tax consequences. In other words, was there a 'realistic
hope of [pre-tax] profit?' "198 Although the first prong of this test kept alive
the pre-Lyon subjective intent analysis, the Rice court's approach robbed it
of any practical significance. Even if the tax court concluded that the buyer-
lessor did not possess the requisite subjective intent, that he entered into the
transaction solely to secure its beneficial tax consequences without consid-
ering the nontax profit potential, it would recognize the transaction as styled
by the parties if the second prong of the test were satisfied. 99 Thus, even
after reciting a litany of evidence to support its conclusion that Rice did
not possess the requisite subjective intent,2°° the court considered the pre-
tax profit potential of the transaction.
190. Rice purchased the computer and leased it back to his seller for a term of eight years.
At the end of the lease term, the seller retained a 30% interest in any proceeds which Rice
might generate by sale or re-lease of the machine. Id. at 186, 192.
191. Id. at 186.
192. Id. at 192. The note was payable in four installments, the first one due on the day the
note was made in June 1976.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. See id. at 192-94.
196. Id. at 201.
197. Id. at 202.
198. Id. at 209 (emphasis added) (quoting Dunlap v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1377 (1980),
rev'd and remanded, 670 F.2d 785 (8th Cir. 1982)).
199. Id. at 203.
200. Id. at 185-89. Rice first considered the transaction just a few months before he signed
the final papers in June of 1976. Id. at 185. Finalco gave him a prospectus outlining the cash
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The Rice court's analysis of pre-tax profit potential relied heavily upon
expert testimony regarding the projected residual value of the computer at
the end of the eight-year lease term.20 1 The court calculated that Rice's initial
investment came to $280,000, comprised of the $250,000 principal and the
$30,000 interest on the nonrecourse note.2"2 The two sources of return on
that investment were the net cash flows over the term of the lease, $10,000
per year, plus 70% of the computer's residual value. 2 a After reviewing the
testimony of several experts, 204 the court assumed a residual value of $150,000
for the computer; Rice's 70% share of that was $105,000. Thus, the court
concluded, even after assuming a discount rate of zero,2 5 the assumption
most favorable to Rice, a return of $185,000,206 did not justify Rice's initial
$280,000 investment.
The Rice court's interpretation of Lyon's economic substance requirement
relegated the pre-Lyon intent and the Narver imprudent-abandonment anal-
yses to roles of secondary importance. A showing that the buyer-lessor lacked
the requisite intent would not be fatal to a transaction shown by objective
economic analysis to possess an opportunity for profit. 207 In only one instance
would a showing of intent be relevant to the Rice court: where a taxpayer
mistakenly believed that a transaction devoid of economic substance pos-
sessed a potential for profit.208 It is difficult to see, however, how a buyer-
lessor could show that she possessed a reasonable hope for profit in a
transaction devoid of objective indicia of economic substance.
The Rice court did not completely abandon the Narver imprudent-aban-
donment approach. It used that analysis only to show that Rice did not
possess the requisite subjective profit motive. The tax court's failure to use
imprudent abandonment, as it had in Narver, to completely invalidate the
transaction is especially significant considering the fact that it easily could
flows which the transaction would generate, clearly showing that, during the first five years of
the transaction, substantial tax losses would result from use of accelerated depreciation and
interest deductions. See id. at 186-87. Despite the fact that his accountant informed him that
the decision whether to enter into the transaction would depend upon Rice's assessment of the
computer's residual value, Rice never seriously considered what the value might be. See id. at
188-89. In fact, Rice had in his possession a Stanford Research Institute Report, given to him
by Finalco representatives, strongly indicating that the residual value of the computer would
be negligible. Id. at 201.
201. Id. at 190-92, 205.
202. Id. at 206.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 190-92, 205.
205. Id. at 205-206.
206. Rice's return is comprised of the $80,000 in net cash flows over the eight-year term of
the lease and the residual value of $105,000 at the end of the lease.
207. 81 T.C. at 203 n.17.
208. Id.
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have. In Rice, just as in Narver, the price paid by the buyer-lessor clearly
exceeded the fair market value of what she got in return.20
Estate of Thomas v. Commissioner, 210 decided by the tax court in 1985,
involved a transaction which, at first glance, closely resembles the Rice sale-
leaseback. In Estate of Thomas, however, the court found that the trans-
action possessed the requisite substance. An E.F. Hutton-formed partnership
purchased 2l' IBM computers and leased them to financially sound lessees
for a term of eight years. 21 2 The partnership financed its purchase with
$8,124,561 of nonrecourse debt and $945,673 of capital invested by the
limited partners. 2 a The rent payments to the partnership net of the part-
nership's nonrecourse debt obligations yielded a modest cash flow to the
partnership over the term of the lease.21 4 At the end of the lease term, the
partnership retained the right to sell or re-lease the computers at fair market
values. 215 The partnership's offering prospectus identified three sources of
return to potential investors: the tax benefits, the modest cash flow over the
life of the lease, and the residual value at the end of the lease.216'
The Commissioner attempted to recharacterize the transaction either as a
sale to the seller-lessee or as a financing arrangement. 217 His basic argument
was that the partnership's ownership of the computers was a sham, devoid
of any economic substance. 218 The tax court employed a traditional risk-
benefit analysis to refute the Commissioner's attempt to recharacterize the
transaction as a sale. The court pointed out that the partnership's interest
in the residual was substantial, and that the partnership bore the risk that
the residual value would be inadequate to make the transaction profitable. 2t 9
The court's analysis of the economic substance of the sale-leaseback as a
financing arrangement was consistent with the pre-tax profit potential anal-
ysis employed in Hilton and Rice. "[A] reasonable potential for [pre-tax]
profit.., clearly constitutes the requisite substance." 20 The court's focus was
209. Finalco purchased the computer for $1,297,653, and shortly thereafter sold Rice a 70%
interest in it for $1,455,277. Id. at 192. Rice paid $1,455,277 for ($1,297,653 x .70 =) $908,357
of value, a price clearly in excess of fair market value.
210. 84 T.C. 412 (1985).
211. The partnership played an insignificant role in the purchase process. The lessees placed
orders directly with IBM for the systems they desired and the partnership played no role in
helping the lessees select the package which would best suit their needs. The machines were
delivered directly to the lessees and the partnership received only paper title. Id. at 421-22.
212. Id. at 417.
213. Id. at 422.
214. Id. at 416, 417-18, 424.
215. Id. at 425. Three of the leases gave the lessees the option to purchase or re-lease the
equipment at fair market value. The other leases required the lessees to deliver the computers
to locations specified by the partnership.
216. Id. at 416.
217. Id. at 432.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 433-35.
220. Id. at 437.
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on the residual value of the machines as the primary determinant of pre-
tax profit potential;22' unlike the Rice court, however, it found that the
residual value could reasonably have been expected to be high enough to
justify the partnership's initial investment. 2 2
Estate of Thomas is significant in two respects. First, it illustrates the
willingness of the court to employ the post-Lyon profitability analysis. The
transaction in Estate of Thomas was not a modern sale-leaseback, but rather
a leveraged leasing arrangement. 223 Yet, the tax court subjected the trans-
action to the same economic substance analysis previously applied to sale-
leasebacks. Second, the case illustrates the potency of the analysis. In Estate
of Thomas, by assuming a discount rate of zero the tax court illustrated
how a residual value as low as 14% would have yielded a slight profit, 224
while a residual value of 20% would have yielded an even greater one.n
By making a more realistic assumption of a discount rate greater than zero,
226
however, the court could easily have invalidated the transaction. An assumed
discount rate of only 3% in the 14% residual value example, and 6% in
the 20% residual value example, would have shown the transaction to be
unprofitable on a pre-tax basis. 227 In Rice, the tax court did not have to
221. Id.; see also id. at 426-31 for the court's discussion of residual value.
222. Id. at 437.
223. The partnership purchased the computers from IBM, an unrelated third party, and
leased them to the lessees. In a sale-leaseback the lessor purchases the asset from the lessee
and leases it back. See supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text.
224. See 84 T.C. at 429 n.26.
225. See id. at n.27.
226. Because $1 today is worth more than $1 in one year, the discount rate will always be
greater than zero. For a discussion of this time value of money concept and its relationship
to discount rate, see supra note 87 and accompanying text.
227.
Cash Inflows Present Value of
Net Rent Residual Value Cash Inflows
Year (See 84 T.C. 14% 20% i = 3% i = 6%
at 417-18)
1975 0 0 0
1976 9,000 8,483 8,010








LESS: INITIAL INVESTMENT <1,200,000> <1,200,000>
NET PRESENT VALUE < 152,458> < 24,516>
Thus under both sets of assumptions, a 3% discount rate with a 14% residual value and a
6% discount rate with a 20% residual value, a negative net present value will be yielded. A
negative net present value means that, when the time value of money is considered, the
transaction is unprofitable. For a discussion of present value and net present value analysis,
see supra notes 87-88.
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assume a discount rate greater than zero to invalidate the transaction; in
that case a zero discount rate was all that was required to show lack of pre-
tax profit poterntial.2 s A higher discount rate would only have made the
transaction appear even more unprofitable.? 9 In Estate of Thomas, the tax
court again declined to make the realistic assumption, but this time with the
result of finding a pre-tax profit where none existed. Perhaps something else
motivated the tax court. 230
III. CRITICISM AND PROPOSED ANALYSIS
The foregoing review of the tax court's post-Lyon decisions illustrates
that, although the tax court has not yet developed a unified approach to
sale-leasebacks, it has developed a potent new weapon with which to challenge
and recharacterize these often useful financing transactions. The pre-tax
profitability requirement would, if consistently applied, result in the re-
characterization of virtually all modern sale-leasebacks. As the net present
value analysis has shown, the only way that the typical modern sale-leaseback
could yield a pre-tax profit would be through an unusually high residual
value. 23' Due to the time value of money, when a long-term lease is employed,
the value of the asset at the end of the lease would usually have to exceed
the value of the asset at the beginning of the lease for the present value of
the pre-tax inflows to exceed initial cash investment. 23 2 Even when a short-
term lease is used, the pre-tax profitability requirement could be prohibi-
tive. 233
The threat of recharacterization affects investors by giving them an in-
centive to structure their transactions to minimize the risk that their tax
expectations will be frustrated. 234 In the sale-leaseback context, where prof-
itability to the investing buyer-lessor hinges on the availability of the desired
tax consequences, 235 that threat is especially potent. If the sale-leaseback, as
structured, does not satisfy the Commissioner and the courts, the buyer-
228. See supra notes 202-07 and accompanying text.
229. See supra note 87.
230. See infra notes 245-46 and accompanying text.
231. See supra notes 89-96 and accompanying text.
232. Id.; see also supra notes 174-76 and accompanying text. But see supra notes 220-29.
233. See Rice's Toyota World, Inc. v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 184 (1983), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 752 F.2d 89 (4th Cir. 1985). For a discussion of Rice, see supra notes 192-209
and accompanying text.
234. See generally, e.g., Cook, supra note 2. The author discusses sale-leasebacks from the
tax planners' perspective. He discusses the implications of the judicial treatment of sale-
leasebacks on planning and structuring these transactions in the future.
235. See supra notes 96-103 and accompanying text.
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lessor stands to suffer a substantial loss.23 6 The added risk makes the trans-
action less attractive than it otherwise might be.
Recharacterization is not necessarily a bad thing. By its very nature the
sale-leaseback provides the investor with a tax shelter and is, therefore, often
subject to abuse. Some sale-leasebacks serve no valid economic purpose
other than to shelter the investor's income. These sale-leasebacks deserve to
be recharacterized. Rice's Toyota World, Inc. v. Commissionere7 is a good
example of a sale-leaseback which served no valid economic purpose. Finalco,
a leasing company, sold Rice a computer which was already subject to a
lease. Nothing in the facts of the opinion indicates that Finalco satisfied
any legitimate financing requirements by entering into the transaction. 238 The
court also failed to indicate that Finalco reinvested the proceeds of the sale.
into productive investment projects. Apparently, the transaction created no
new productive assets.
Not all sale-leasebacks deserve to be recharacterized. The transaction may
not be merely a valuable tax sheltered investment for the buyer-lessor; it
may also provide a valuable financing tool for the seller-lessee.239 It allows
him to release capital locked up in fixed assetsm' and to redeploy it to
potentially more productive uses. In contrast to Rice, Hilton24' exemplifies
a sale-leaseback which should not have been recharacterized. Broadway was
able to finance the construction of a new shopping area in Bakersfield. It
could have used other financing methods, but the sale-leaseback possessed
substantial tax and nontax benefits which made it the most attractive alter-
native. In addition, the funds which the transaction generated for Broadway
were invested into new and productive assets.242
The pre-tax profit requirement is problematic because it does not distin-
guish between good and bad sale-leasebacks, between those that deserve to
be recharacterized and those that do not. The analysis is too one-dimensional.
By requiring nontax substance on that side of the transaction where none
exists, the analysis condemns virtually all sale-leasebacks without even con-
sidering the socially desirable nontax benefits which flow from the seller-
lessee's side.
In response to this shortcoming, Congress or the courts should adopt a
broader perspective and develop an approach which analyzes the transaction
236. Id.
237. 81 T.C. 184 (1983), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 752 F.2d 89 (4th Cir. 1985).
238. See id.
239. See supra notes 40-48 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 52-59 and accom-
panying text.
240. See, e.g., Carey, Tax Aspects, supra note 3, at 601; Cook, supra note 2, at A-1.
241. 74 T.C. 305 (1980), aff'd, 671 F.2d 319 (9th Cir. 1982).
242. See id.
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in terms of social costs and social benefits. 243 This Note has already discussed
the social benefits2" which result from the utility of the sale-leaseback as a
financing device and the use to which the funds that the sale-leaseback
generate may be put. Among the benefits to be evaluated in Hilton are the
construction and retail merchandising jobs which the project created, the
other projects and stores which the newly constructed facility would attract,
and the influx of cash into the local community which these two factors
would generate. Perhaps a recognition of the social benefits of the transaction
was what motivated the tax court in Estate of Thomas.245 The court con-
sidered significant the fact that the lessees were able to obtain lower rentals
from the partnership than they would have been able to obtain by renting
directly from IBM or other commercial lessors.2" The social benefits in Rice
would have been more difficult to uncover. The seller-lessee built no new
productive assets, the transaction generated no jobs or related investment
projects, and no benefits flowed into the community.
The social costs should be expressed in terms of the decrease in treasury
revenue incurred as a result of the sale-leaseback. This figure represents a
societal investment in the transaction; the social costs are the amount of
government services, expressed in dollar figures, which society sacrifices in
order to achieve the social benefits which the transaction creates. If the
social benefits outweigh the social costs, the transaction should not be
recharacterized. Conversely, if the social costs outweigh the social benefits,
the transaction should be recharacterized.
The social costs are simply the tax consequences of the sale-leaseback247
to the parties viewed from the Treasury's perspective. The net tax savings
realized by the buyer-lessor and the seller-lessee are revenue losses to the
Treasury. These losses result from two factors: new deductions which the
transaction creates, and the tax rate differential between the seller-lessee and
the buyer-lessor. Congress, the Commissioner or the courts should consider
numerous factors in order to develop a sound and comprehensive social cost
analysis.248
243. A detailed discussion of all the factors which the proposed analysis should consider is
beyond the scope of this Note. The discussion which follows only highlights some of the more
important factors which the proposed analysis should consider. See supra notes 244-53 and
accompanying text. Because the analysis would require a careful weighing of countervailing
social cost and benefit factors, formulation of a detailed test is best left in the hands of the
legislature.
244. See supra notes 52-59 and accompanying text.
245. 84 T.C. 412 (1985).
246. Id. at 437.
247. See supra notes 60-78.
248. An in-depth discussion of all the factors which the analysis should consider is beyond
the scope of this Note. See supra notes 249-52 for a brief review of the most important aspects
which the analysis should encompass.
[Vol. 61:721
SALE-LEASEBACKS
When the Supreme Court in Lyon249 noted that sale-leaseback financing
does not create any new deductions,250 it failed to consider a few of the not
so subtle nuances of the transaction. When the seller-lessee sells a newly
constructed, fully depreciable asset, the transaction does not create any new
deduction. The seller-lessee transfers only the depreciation deduction that he
could have taken himself and replaces it with a rental deduction. Although
the buyer-lessor may take the newly created rental deduction, the resulting
loss to the Treasury is offset because the buyer-lessor must also recognize
that amount as income. Viewed in this light, a sale-leaseback only shifts
deductions from one party to another, or creates deductions for one party
which are offset by concomitant income to the other.
In many situations, however, the transaction does create deductions. When
the property sold consists of a fully depreciated asset, the seller-lessee does
not give up any future depreciation deductions; he has already fully depre-
ciated the value of the asset conveyed.-The buyer-lessor, on the other hand,
may depreciate his cost. Under this circumstance, the transaction does create
a depreciation deduction. Similarly, if part of the property sold and leased
back consists of real estate, the buyer-lessor can inflate the depreciation
deduction shifted to him by allocating as much of his cost as possible to
the depreciable asset.
Sale-leaseback financing may also result in lost tax revenue due to the
income tax rate differential between the parties. Typically, the seller-lessee
will be in a lower tax bracket than the buyer-lessor. 251 In that situation, even
to the extent that the transaction results only in shifting deductions, revenue
losses will ensue. The seller-lessee may have been in a position to fully realize
the tax benefits of the depreciation deduction, but by shifting that deduction
to a higher bracket buyer-lessor, the transaction results in a net loss of
revenue, a social cost. 252 The tax rate differential will also result in an
offsetting revenue gain, a social benefit which the analysis should not fail
to consider. A rental deduction to the seller-lessee is rental income to the
buyer-lessor. If the buyer-lessor were in a higher tax bracket than the seller-
lessee, the net result of these offsetting items of income and expense would
be additional revenue to the Treasury, a social benefit.
249. 435 U.S. 561 (1978), rev'g 536 F.2d 746 (8th Cir. 1976).
250. See id. at 580; see also Kronovet, supra note 2, at 257.
251. See J. VAN HoRNE, supra note 3, at 497-98.
252. For example, suppose the seller-lessee is in a 40% tax bracket and the buyer-lessor is
in a 60% tax bracket. Also assume that a $100 depreciation deduction is at issue. If the seller-
lessee keeps the deduction, the Treasury will lose ($100 x .40=) $40. If the deduction is shifted
to the buyer-lessor by a valid sale-leaseback, the Treasury will lose ($100 x .60=) $60. The




The primary advantage of this proposed social cost-benefit analysis is that
it distinguishes between those sale-leasebacks which are socially desirable
and those which are not. Unlike the emerging pre-tax profitability require-
ment, the proposed analysis would not dismiss out-of-hand all but the most
exceptional sale-leasebacks. It would not require an exceptionally high re-
sidual value before permitting the potential economically and socially desir-
able consequences of the transaction to inure to the community's benefit.
The social cost-benefit analysis balances the competing interests of the Treas-
ury and the business community, and resolves the conflict in favor of the
side whose claim benefits society the most. So long as the transaction is
supported by a project whose social benefits outweigh the revenue loss, the
transaction would stand as structured. A social cost-benefit analysis would
encourage tax planners and business persons to be sure that behind their
transaction lies a socially desirable investment project, one which creates
jobs, income, or otherwise benefits the community.
Finally, the analysis would allow the courts to explicitly analyze the policy
considerations which underlie what is ultimately at issue in sale-leaseback
recharacterization cases-who gets the depreciation deduction. One of the
primary justifications for the deductibility of depreciation is that it encour-
ages investment in productive assets. 2 3 The intent, risk-benefit, and pre-tax
profitability modes of analysis currently employed by the courts are lacking
because they do not explicitly consider the policy justification for what is
at stake. The proposed social cost-benefit analysis would, if adopted, give
the courts a valuable tool with which to give effect to a clearly expressed
legislative policy.
STEPHIAN L. HODGE
253. See generally, CHRISTENSEN, FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION 129-41 (3d ed. 1982).
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